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After a century of humiliation and half a century of isolation, China is back in its "natural" place. That is, where it has been for millennia: in the "center" of the world, between heaven and earth—this is what China means in its language. The current Chinese leaders—the Communist Party, understood not as a repository and transmitter of ideology, but as an instrument of social hierarchy and political power—are "recovering" history. And they do so, as it cannot be otherwise, from their geographical position. History always returns and geography always is. China, like Russia, as a fundamentally terrestrial power, has viewed its security in the expansion of its perimeter to more easily defensible borders, and the further away from the hard core of the country, the better. An area that we can identify with "North China," an immense plain—of a similar extension to that of Spain—between the Yellow and Yangtze river basins, and which has marked its foreign policy for millennia.
For this reason, China directed its expansion northward after the Mongol invasions, towards the Gobi Desert; northeastward with the incorporation of Manchuria and establishing borders with Russia; southward, reaching the current borders with Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar—the former Burma—; and eastward, with the annexations of Xinjiang—with a Muslim majority and serious secessionist problems—and Tibet, an ancient "buffer" state with India, and consequently, an essential element of China's foreign policy. In both cases, China's determination to maintain these territories is total and absolute, because they are of vital importance for its perception of security. And further east, we encounter the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, now independent and with complex geopolitical and economic relations with China, Russia, and Turkey.
ONE BELT, ONE ROAD
Hence the transcendental importance of the Chinese initiative One Belt, One Road (OBOR), the new Silk Road. An initiative that should be framed within a new, much more aggressive foreign policy, oriented not to the will of extending its political project of coexistence, but to expanding its global geostrategic influence. And it responds to a great transformation, unprecedented in its history: China has assumed —and has externalized it in the resolutions of the recent XIX Congress of the Communist Party— that if it wants to be the great global power by the middle of this century, it must become a great land power —as it has historically been—, but also an air-naval power and in space. For this reason, we will have to get used to seeing Chinese warships in any sea or ocean on the planet, military bases on other continents —such as Africa—, and a spectacular satellite deployment that is linked to the great strategic commitment to be a great technological power, based on its human capital and an enormous effort in education and training.
In this context, one of the most ambitious initiatives is OBOR. We are talking about the contemporary reformulation of the historic Silk Road, a structuring factor of what we know as the heart of the world —that is, Eurasia—, of which the great thinkers of geopolitics spoke to us, starting with the great Harold John Mackinder, more than a century ago. The Silk Road was coined as a concept at the end of the 19th century, to describe the extraordinary history of the intense commercial exchanges between China and Europe over many centuries, and through great empires, such as the Persian, Ottoman or Byzantine, and the great European powers, such as Tsarist Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Holy Roman-Germanic Empire, or the Hispanic, French, Portuguese, Dutch or British monarchies.
Obviously, this is a magnificent example of the advantages of cooperative commercial exchange—and one that disproves, avant la lettre, the obsolete and stale arguments in favor of commercial protectionism, which we have to endure today. But in its current configuration, and at China's initiative, it also constitutes an extraordinary example of a sum of strategic projects based on transport infrastructures, both by road and, above all, by rail—which, by definition, also imply an exchange of ideas and transmission of soft power—and which involve mutually beneficial economic realities.
It is a project that, from its terrestrial perspective, consolidates China's position in Central Asia, and from its maritime perspective, in the Indian Ocean. Let's consider that we are talking about an initial financing set at around 800,000 million euros—three-quarters of Spain's GDP—and that it refers us to something as extraordinary as what the Marshall Plan was for Western Europe at the end of the Second World War. Some sixty countries have joined this project—including its maritime component—among them, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, or Brazil, and more recently, Japan, initially reluctant for historical reasons and due to pressure from the United States.
The territories covered by the new Silk Road affect a third of global international trade, 70% of the population, and 55% of global GDP. And it should be added that it includes territories that accumulate three-quarters of the planet's fossil energy reserves, and that's apart from the Arctic Ocean, although that is another topic, whose relevance in the immediate future will be crucial.
All of this, evidently, is by no means trivial from a geostrategic point of view, both in Central Asia and in the Indian Ocean because Central Asia—the former republics, now independent, of the defunct Soviet Union—has a natural and historical relationship with Russia, but also, for many religious, linguistic, and ethnic reasons, with Turkey, and they are a natural border with Iran, that is, the ancient Persian Empire. And in the Indian Ocean, because we are talking about the relationship, almost always tense and, at times, belligerent, with the other great Asian power—for now only regional, but increasingly relevant on a global scale—which is India, and the not always friendly relationship with the countries of Southeast Asia.
It is intimately linked to the extraordinary strategic significance of the Strait of Malacca.
STRING OF PEARLS
The Strait of Malacca is located on the world's equator and is the unavoidable natural connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The author of this article has been arguing for many years that it is the point where the planet's center of gravity is located, which leads us to other considerations that we will only mention in passing.
One of them is that even the usual terminology has become obsolete: we still speak of Japan, China, or Indonesia as the Far East. A grave error of appreciation: they are at the center, and we are the ones who are far or extreme: Europe, from this perspective, is the new Far West, from a geopolitical point of view. And another is that, for China, free transit through Malacca —between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia— is absolutely vital for the sustainability of its economic system and to continue adequately fueling its intense growth process. Hence China's effort, also military, to secure its presence in the South China Sea, and to maintain friendly relations with the riparian countries of the Strait and, particularly, with Singapore, which has an ethnic Chinese majority. But this also explains the maritime projection of OBOR, something completely new in history.
Thus, in the same way that India is consolidating a strategic relationship with Iran, to establish an alternative maritime route to the land passage through Pakistan, China has established a no less strategic relationship with Bangladesh, to "bypass," through Myanmar —hence China's permanent support for the Burmese regime—, the Strait of Malacca and have an alternative outlet to the Indian Ocean. From there, the Chinese strategy is commonly known as the string of pearls, because the connection points of a new maritime Silk Road can draw something similar in their connection. And it has not only economic and commercial sense, but also military and strategic.
The starting point is in the most important port of Bangladesh, near Dhaka, in the Ganges Delta. From there, the other connection point is in Sri Lanka —the former Ceylon—. The next is located in Pakistan —ancestral enemy of India and traditional ally of Beijing—, with the financing of an enormous port —which can also be a Chinese military base— in Gwadar. And from there, the next step is Djibouti, guarantor of free circulation through the Bab el Mandeb strait and, therefore, a natural connection from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, and through the Suez Canal, to the Mediterranean. And it is no coincidence that China has established an enormous military base there, with capacity for some 6,000 troops, larger than the largest American military base in Africa, located in that same small country. And the final point —for now— is the port of Piraeus, in Greece, literally bought by Chinese capital. But this Chinese presence in Europe will go further. And it is no longer a coincidence to see Chinese corvettes or frigates in various Mediterranean ports, including some Spanish ones.
THE NEW GREAT GAME
Obviously, all this strategy is not viewed with indifference, but rather with concern and open hostility, by the United States or by India, which are developing a joint strategic vision —which includes countries like Japan, or also Australia— that incorporate an "Indo-Pacific" approach clearly opposed to China's strategic interests: the new Big Game, a new Great Game that the British spoke of in their struggle with Tsarist Russia, for their dominance in the Asian subcontinent watered by the Indian Ocean. Now the great struggle is between China and the rest of the actors present in the region, including the United States.
Let's go back to history and geography. As a central empire and great land power, China has historically practiced two things. First, the policy oriented towards having subjugated, vassal, and "barbarian" or enemy peoples. Suffice it to recall Emperor Qianlong's reply letter to British King George III, in 1793, regarding his request to establish diplomatic and commercial relations between both empires. It is a response that is at once dismissive, disdainful, and humiliating, typical of a civilization with thousands of years of history that has been, until the mid-19th century, the most powerful and most populous nation in the world. And which wants to be so again economically and politically (demographically, it will soon be surpassed by India).
And, secondly, China has needed access to the West, which by land was historically materialized with the Silk Road, connecting it with the East Indies, Central Asia, the Middle East, and finally, with Europe. But it also always felt the need to project itself to the rest of the world through its free access to the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Like the United States, China wishes to be a bioceanic power. The United States achieved this towards the Pacific, with its "manifest destiny" towards the entire west of the primitive thirteen colonies, and the war with Mexico, in addition to the purchase of Alaska from the Russians—how many times they must have regretted it! Now they would have full control of the Bering Strait—and the incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands, barely sixty years ago. But for its Atlantic projection, it had to guarantee control of the Caribbean, in a process that Spaniards know well, with the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Well, for China "its Caribbean" is the South China Sea, because its control allows it free access to the Pacific and, above all, access to the Indian Ocean, through Malacca.
Everything is, therefore, complementary in a clear strategy by China to be and guarantee itself to be a great global power, facing the United States. And the new silk roads are an essential piece in it, though not the only one. The first step of "American imperialism" was the so-called Monroe Doctrine. America for Americans, which meant a rejection of European interference in the continent and, at the same time, a clear hegemonic will in it on the part of the United States. And the next step was to become the great global power it is today.
ASIA FOR THE ASIANS
Similarly, China intends for Asia to be for the Asians, that is, rejecting American interference in the continent, and, above all, projecting China's hegemonic will in it, as a first step to becoming a great global power, in strategic dispute with the United States. And if doing so helps weaken the Atlantic link on which the concept of the West is based, it will do so without complexes. Hence the vital importance for Europe of drawing its own strategy as a political project perceived as such from the outside. But this is another topic. The truth is that, in any case, the main scenario of confrontation is located around Malacca and moves us away from the traditional scenarios of dispute: the Middle East and Europe. The world to come represents a transcendental change of era.