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What a deafening silence in the face of Europe's demographic suicide on the 2050 horizon! The demographic projections for the major regions of the world until mid-century are known and re-evaluated every two years by the United Nations and regularly by Eurostat for all member states of the European Union —a total of 511 million inhabitants—, but one has to be a database specialist to use them. In fact, no one talks about them, especially in Brussels, where they prefer to produce reports on technological revolutions, sustainable development, or energy transition. It is up to us to warn —it is our function—, even if we know that in 2050 we will not be here to lament that we were not listened to. Contrary to what will happen in North America, which will see its population increase by 75 million inhabitants —about two times less than South America—, Europe could stagnate around 500 million inhabitants and lose 49 million people of working age in the 20-64 age bracket, 11 million of them in Germany. Spain and Italy, for their part, would lose between 7 and 8 million potential workers, while France could be content with not catching up with Germany, something that, however, the United Kingdom would do. We cannot be happy with such a prospect because neighbors are also their main markets: 87% of what is produced in France is consumed in Europe, 70% in the country itself and 17% outside its borders. That represents 56% of the 30% that is exported worldwide.
DEMOGRAPHIC TECTONICS
The other predictions of demographic tectonics until 2050 are no more encouraging: China, Japan, and Russia would lose, respectively, 38 million, 20 million, and 15 million inhabitants, while India would increase its number of inhabitants by about 400 million, surpassing China by at least 300 million. The bleeding will be especially considerable for the age group between 20 and 64 years: 22 million less in the case of Russia, 20 million less for Japan, and 195 million less for China. The United States would see its potential workforce increase by almost 20 million in that period.
Europe could stagnate around 500 million inhabitants and lose 49 million people of working age in the 20-64 age bracket. Spain would lose between 7 and 8 million potential workersLabor and talent will be needed to offset these asset losses. Possibilities? According to the same data, Africa's population would increase by 1.3 billion, 130 million in North Africa alone. This means that migratory pressure on Europe will be stronger than ever. However, Europe neither talks about nor prepares for thisshock demographic —internal implosion and external explosion—, as if the demographic tsunami were less important than the wave of numbers. To put an end to this silence, we invite our interlocutors to imagine several million climate refugees from Asia or, even more, political and economic refugees from Africa and the Middle East. Let's say that if 1% of the increase in the African population were to settle in France in the next thirty-five years —which is as close to us as 1980—, this would mean 13 million more inhabitants within the Hexagon in the next thirty-five years, that is, 20% more! If we think of the European Union shaken and weakened in 2015 by a million refugees, mostly political, it is clear that Europe should start preparing for such prospects. It should be inspired by Canada, which does not hesitate to practice a quota policy based on the needs of the labor market. And encourage the revival of fertility in the Old Continent, because the integration of cultures begins in schools. When there is too much sand, the cement does not set. To accommodate more sand, more cement is needed, that is, children who speak the language of the country, whatever their color. In short, to remain open to the world, fertility must be reactivated in Europe now. But who talks about family policy in a Europe that allows hotels and resorts only for adults, prohibited to children and that tolerate only pets?
GRAY HAIR AND WEAK GROWTH
The media timidly begin to be alarmed that in 2016 for the first time, in Europe, the number of deaths exceeded that of births. It is interesting to note that this has been the case in Germany since 1971, in Italy since 1991, in Spain since 2016, in Russia since 1991, in Japan since 2006. China's turn will come in 2028. The phenomenon should not occur in France, nor in the United States, until after 2050. Children are not born from the dead. The demographic suicide of old Europe is a death foretold, but we are still in time: good foresight is not necessarily that which is realized but that which leads to action to avoid it.
To remain open to the world, fertility must be reactivated in Europe now. But who talks about family policy in a Europe that allows hotels and resorts only for adults, prohibited to children and that tolerate only pets?It is a classic to attribute the strong post-war economic growth in Europe to reconstruction and recovery relative to the United States. Those three glorious decades coincided with the demographic wave. However, it is not so common to highlight that in the fifties and sixties, when there were no computers and there was no talk of a technological revolution, the increase in apparent labor productivity was two or three times higher than in the eighties and subsequent years. How can one not see in this high productivity an effect of the experience curve and a decrease in unit production costs in continuously expanding markets? On the contrary, since the early eighties, economic growth and productivity have not stopped slowing down in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Researchers wonder about the causes of this concomitant slowdown in growth and productivity precisely when the technological revolutions of information and communication —ICT—, biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, or energies —renewables and reserves— are more perceptible than ever. It is Solow's famous paradox: "I see computers everywhere but in the productivity statistics." Curiously, these same researchers do not ask about the relationship that could exist between this slowdown in growth and the demographic aging of the old developed areas: the United States, Japan, Europe.
In Europe and Japan, GDP growth was higher in the eighties than in the nineties: 2.5% compared to 2.3% in Europe and 4.6% compared to 1.1% in Japan. Over these two decades, GDP growth in the United States exceeded that of Europe by about one percentage point. The explanation is essentially —for more than half— demographic, given that the deviation in per capita GDP growth is only 0.2 points higher across the Atlantic than in Europe for the same periods. Indeed, demographic growth, around 1% annually in the United States, has been two or three times higher than in Europe since the early sixties. Another part of the explanation for this higher GDP growth in the United States must be sought in higher employment rates and a longer annual working duration. If Americans advance faster, it is because there are more of them and they work more.
THE HIDDEN DEMOGRAPHIC TSUNAMI
In the European Commission, but also in most international and national bodies, the relationship between demography and growth is rarely evoked. Reports on technology, innovation, and competitiveness abound; however, man is only approached as human capital, and from the perspective of training, rightly considered as an investment and a long-term growth factor. Demography is only treated from the perspective of aging "from above" and the problems that arise from it for the balance of pension systems, healthcare expenses, and taking care of dependency, but practically never in relation to the consequences of aging "from below" on growth and on Europe's situation in the world.
In 2000, the ambitious Lisbon strategy for growth and employment essentially focused on information technologies and the growth economy to ensure the future and strength of the European Union on the international stage by 2010. Almost halfway through the period, the Wim Kok Report (2004) maintained its focus on the knowledge society and sustainable development for an enlarged European Union, and dedicated —and this was new— a small page to Europe's aging. This could reduce the Union's growth potential by one point —around 1% instead of 2%— until 2040. But nothing was said about the comparisons of demographic evolutions in Europe and the United States, an oversight even more remarkable if we consider that these comparisons are systematic for research effort, innovation, and productivity measurement.
THE MULTIPLYING EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHY
As Alfred Sauvy used to say, economists "refuse to see" the relationship between economic growth and demographic dynamics, so they do not seek to verify it. However, the golden age of capitalism and the baby-boom went hand in hand, and the takeoff of the United States is undoubtedly also explained by better demographic health. For three decades, its fertility rate has remained at an average of almost 2.1 children per woman, while in Europe it stands at 1.5 and the population, in fact also due to significant migratory flows, continues to increase strongly. The comparison of growth rates between Europe and the United States generally resorts to technique to explain long-term differences. We can ask ourselves if there isn't also a "demographic multiplier" effect.
This hypothesis allows us to better understand why growth and, above all, productivity gains in the fifties and sixties were on average twice as high as in the eighties and nineties, despite being marked by technical revolutions, theoretical sources of productivity gains. With the new economy, the question seemed resolved, with the United States experiencing a period of strong economic growth with productivity gains —apparent labor— much higher than those in Europe. Wasn't this proof that Europe was technologically lagging behind the United States? We can doubt this explanation now that we know the validated statistics for the past. In the eighties, GDP growth per active person was comparable in both areas —around 1.5%—, with a slight advantage for Europe in that decade. However, since the nineties, Europe seems to be falling behind the United States, whose apparent activity —GDP/employed active persons— increased by more than 2% annually in the nineties and 1.5% annually until 2007, 1% after the crisis. In the same period, the rise in productivity in Europe went from 1.7% in the nineties to 1% annually between 2000 and 2007, to fall to 0.3% from 2008. The question is evident: should this gap be attributed to the technological gap or the demographic gap? We put forward the hypothesis that this latter factor plays a decisive role, given that the demographic gap is widening more and more.
DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS AND APPARENT PRODUCTIVITY
The entire population is not active, but the number of hours worked essentially explains the difference in the apparent productivity level of labor per active employee, since Americans work 46% more than the French each year. If they work, it is because there is a demand to satisfy, perhaps also more sustained than elsewhere due to demographic expansion. If we abandon the hypothesis of independence between the two variables "GDP per inhabitant" and "demographic growth," we can put forward a new hypothesis, that of a demographic multiplier that would be at the origin of a significant part of the higher productivity gains in the United States than in Europe. In general, economists—referring to the famous Cobb-Douglas production function—explain growth by three factors: capital, labor, and technical progress. Let's go back to the sources: productivity is the residual of supplementary growth, which is not explained by the increase in production factors (capital and labor). For lack of anything better, we attribute this increase in GDP growth per active person to technical progress (in this case, the expansion of information technologies), which is a positive way of pointing out the inexplicable residue.
The question is evident: should this gap be attributed to the technological 'gap' or the demographic 'gap'? We put forward the hypothesis that the latter factor plays a decisive role, given that the demographic gap is widening more and moreThe growth of GDP depends on two factors: GDP per employed person and the number of employed persons. The increase in GDP per employed person is in fact much greater in the United States than in Europe since the mid-1990s. In reality, the variation in GDP per active person (apparent labor productivity) is more significant than the number of active workers, and employment opportunities increase in an expanding population. Technical progress, learning, and economies of scale combine their effects to reduce unit costs, improve quality, in short, increase added value, that is, GDP per active person. The multiplier of demographic dynamics continues to favor the United States, certainly less than in the 1960s, but no longer for an aging Europe. Economists do not find this demographic multiplier because they do not look for it. However, this hypothesis would shed more light on the decline in GDP growth per active person, observed between the early 2000s between the United States and Europe, than the delay in information and communication technologies. The long-term growth of developed countries is condemned by demographics: without human capital, growth is limited by lack of oxygen.
THE TREES AND THE FOREST
With a cyclical fertility indicator close to 1.5, Europe will tomorrow have generations of young active people one third less numerous than current ones. A drop in the number of births for a country is equivalent to what a reduction in investment means for a company: it allows it to benefit, for a time, from a more comfortable cash flow, at the cost of serious problems later. It follows that family policy that supports demographic growth is a long-term investment. Some might argue that the birth deficit in Europe and its negative impact on future economic growth and increasing living standards could be compensated by increasingly large migratory flows. They get excited, as recent events such as the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union show, and as also shown by the reactions of the populations of almost all European countries to the flows of migrants from Africa and the Middle East.
European countries are like forests whose trees, at full performance for forty years, have reached maturity without having foreseen their replacement by young shoots. However, to invest and consume, we must have confidence in the future and we need to equip ourselves, characteristics that, unfortunately, recede with age. The springs of dynamism are the same in the economic and demographic fields: the pleasure of living is expressed both by economic initiative and by welcoming children. The spirit of enterprise is a cousin of the family spirit!
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