A Better Europe

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If the first half of the 20th century was defined by a long civil war that extended for three decades, the Europe that emerged from 1945 responded to a curious paradox: on the one hand, Great Britain and France had managed to keep the borders of their empires intact; on the other, their weakness was already manifest. We must not forget that the process of community integration was born as a consequence of the continent's fragility and the fear of nationalisms. Poverty constituted the palpable sign of those years. As economist Barry Eichengreen has pointed out, "in 1950, many Europeans heated their homes with coal, refrigerated food with ice, and depended on what we can euphemistically call rudimentary forms of indoor plumbing." It was, so to speak, an old world inserted into a changing context. However, the second half of the 20th century completely transformed the face of Western Europe. In 1957, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Benelux signed the Treaties of Rome and, although it can be argued—as Tony Judt maintains—that it is not advisable to exaggerate the importance of these agreements, the truth is that their success boosted supranational cooperation until it became an inevitable fact. The long period of internal peace, favorable demographics, increased productivity, the welfare state, and political consensus shaped a golden age for European prosperity. In this long cycle, which lasted until the late eighties, Europe became a middle-class society that normalized access to goods such as cars or home ownership, traditionally reserved for the bourgeoisie. The strength of public policies facilitated a generous social pact that would allow the upward march of the economy and living standards to be consolidated.

The liberal consensus had triumphed, as had the capitalist development model. And, if we are reasonable—even despite the challenge posed by new populisms and the return of political sentimentality—Fukuyama's central thesis still stands

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, 1989 was the logical corollary to the history of the two Europes that emerged from the post-war period. In that year, Francis Fukuyama wrote his famous article "The End of History," which would be the basis of an equally celebrated book published in 1992. The liberal consensus had triumphed, as had the capitalist development model. And, if we are reasonable—even despite the challenge posed by new populisms and the return of political sentimentality—Fukuyama's central thesis still stands. With its due nuances, the framework that favors the solution of complex problems continues to demand market freedom, commercial openness, legal certainty, social protection, and democratic rights. But 1989 meant more than just the fall of real socialism, as it consolidated the true revolution of these last thirty years: the awakening of China and its decisive entry into the wheel of globalization. From a European perspective, this leap forward offered distinctive features after decades of growth. The launch of the euro and the free movement of workers, goods, and services accelerated the construction of a large single market. However, as Tony Judt observes in his seminal work on post-war Europe, "things were no longer as they had been, when periods of economic boom tended to provide the disadvantaged with better-paid and more secure jobs. In other words, Europe was creating a marginalized class in the midst of the bonanza."

The 2008 crash exacerbated some of the tensions that had been accumulating. Population aging and high public and private debt, productivity stagnation, and structural unemployment suddenly overshadowed the Union's successful narrative. After thirty years of undeniable progress and another thirty years of welfare maintenance, the ghost of populism has re-emerged, with the Brexit episode as one of its culminating chapters. But, above all, the specter of social atomization has returned, which, while announcing a new geography of intelligence, also divides citizens between apocalyptics and integrated, with the deterioration of expectations of the middle and working class and the discredit of the political elite as a backdrop. Guided by deep skepticism, essayist Pierre Manent has warned about the danger of a Ciceronian moment for Europe, which is torn between the desire for greater integration and the temptation to renationalize sovereignty. Faced with this dilemma, it is worth considering that the future of the EU lies in a reformism that allows community institutions to adapt to the challenges of our time and that, in turn, proves capable of mitigating social unrest and strengthening the living standards—and the horizon of opportunities—of citizens. It would be about recovering the value of a reasonable politics for an era marked by profound structural transformations. Nothing very different, ultimately, from the longing for a shared and better Europe that was born in Rome sixty years ago.